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Abstract
An announcement scheme is a system that facilitates vehicles to
broadcast road-related information in vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs)
in order to improve road safety and efficiency. Here we propose a new
cryptographic primitive for public updating of reputation score based
on the Boneh-Boyen-Shacham short group signature scheme. This al-
lows private reputation score retrieval without a secure channel. Using
this we devise a privacy-aware announcement scheme using reputation
systems which is reliable, auditable and robust.
∗The initial idea of this material was published in the WiVeC proceedings [9] and a
comprehensive solution was presented in CTTD 2013 (no proceedings) [10]. This paper is
a full version of the whole work.
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1 Introduction
Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) allow vehicles to exchange information
about vehicle, road, and traffic conditions. We call a system that facilitates
vehicles to exchange road-related information an announcement scheme. If
the road-related information exchanged in an announcement scheme is reli-
able then this would enable a safer and more efficient travelling environment.
We say that a message is reliable if it reflects reality. Unreliable messages
may result in various consequences, for example journey delays or accidents.
Unreliable messages may be a result of vehicle hardware malfunction. For
example, if a sensor in a vehicle is faulty then messages generated from the
faulty sensor may be false. Unreliable messages can also be generated in-
tentionally. For example, some vehicles may generate and broadcast false
road congestion messages with the intention to deceive other vehicles into
avoiding certain routes. In extreme cases, unreliable message may lead to
injuries and even deaths. Hence, an announcement should have the following
functionalities:
• Message reliability evaluation. Vehicles should be able to evaluate the
reliability of received messages.
• Auditability. Vehicles that broadcast unreliable messages should be
identified and revoked.
In addition, the announcement scheme should satisfy the following secu-
rity requirements:
• Robustness. The accuracy of message reliability evaluation and au-
ditability should not be affected by attacks, from both internal and
external adversaries.
• Privacy awareness. The privacy of vehicles should be protected, since
the information about vehicle position is often sensitive to vehicle users.
The vehicle privacy has two facets as follows:
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– Anonymity. The identity of a vehicle should not be revealed from
data broadcast by the vehicle.
– Unlinkability. Multiple pieces of data broadcast by the same ve-
hicle should not be linked to each other.
In [9] a privacy-aware reputation-based announcement scheme for VANETs
was proposed. This scheme relies on a centralised reputation system with an
off-line trusted authority, and uses group signatures to allow vehicles to make
authenticated announcements anonymously. An announcement will be ac-
cepted as reliable if the announcing vehicle has a sufficiently high reputation.
The reputation reflects the extent to which the vehicle has announced reli-
able messages in the past. It is computed and updated based on feedback
reported by other vehicles. The reputation scores of all vehicles are managed
by a central reputation server. This scheme has two fundamental weaknesses:
firstly, the decision as to whether an announcement is trustworthy or not is
made by the reputation server rather than the receiving vehicle, since only
vehicles deemed reputable by the reputation server are given signing keys,
and the signatures do not reveal what the reputation scores are. Secondly,
a secure channel is required for the retrieval of new signing keys (and hence
new reputation status). In [9] a brief sketch was provided to indicate how
these weaknesses may be overcome. Here we describe in full a new crypto-
graphic primitive which enables the design of a scheme to address these two
weaknesses:
1. We propose a new tool for public updating of reputation score based
on the Boneh-Boyen-Shacham (BBS) short group signature scheme [5].
When the reputation score of a group member Vb changes, Vb is able
to update its signing key using a public value in such a way that its
signature is bound to the new reputation score. This signature can be
verified by other group members, again using a public value. This over-
comes the significant problem of having to establish a secure channel
for reputation score retrieval.
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2. Using this new cryptographic primitive we improve the scheme of [9] to
support flexible decision-making on the part of the receiving vehicle. If
a reputation score is visible in a group signature then a receiving vehicle
may decide whether to trust the announcement depending on the type
of announcement and the announcing vehicle’s reputation score. Our
scheme here supports this.
2 Related Work
There have been a number of announcement schemes proposed to evaluate
the reliability of messages in VANETs. These can be categorised into two
main groups: threshold method and reputation-based method.
A majority of announcement schemes, e.g. [12, 13, 19, 25, 31, 30, 22], use
the threshold method: a message is believed reliable if it has been announced
by multiple distinct vehicles whose number exceeds a threshold within a
time interval. This method gives rise to the problem of distinguishability of
message origin [15] - how to tell if two messages are made by two distinct
vehicles if vehicles are anonymous and their activities are unlinkable. Solu-
tions to this problem include using message linked group signatures [31] and
a combination of Direct Anonymous Attestation [11] and 1-time anonymous
authentication [27]. In addition, this method is only suitable for event-driven
messages, where multiple vehicles may broadcast the same message. It is not
suitable for beacon messages, where a beacon is only broadcast by one vehi-
cle.
There have been several reputation-based methods, such as [14, 23, 26,
20, 9, 28]. The schemes in [14, 23, 26] adopt a decentralised infrastructure
while those in [20, 9, 28] use a centralised system. In [20] Li et al. proposed
a reputation-based announcement scheme that aims to provide message re-
liability evaluation, auditability, and robustness. A vehicle periodically re-
trieves its reputation certificate, which contains its reputation score, from
the central authority. When a vehicle broadcasts a message, it attaches its
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reputation certificate to the message. A receiving vehicle extracts the repu-
tation score and then infers the reliability of the message. A vehicle whose
reputation score decreases beyond a threshold is revoked by the central au-
thority. This is achieved by no longer providing the vehicle its reputation
certificate in the future. However, this scheme [20] lacks the provision of
privacy protection to vehicles: messages and feedback are linkable and not
anonymous. An adversary is able to conduct a profiling attack to learn the
moving trace of a target vehicle. This drawback may affect the willingness
of vehicles to participate in the announcement scheme. The scheme in [28]
suffers from the same drawback. This drawback is rectified in the scheme
of [9], which we will describe in detail in Section 3. On the other hand, [7]
considers how a reputation-based scheme may be extended to allow multihop
communications.
In [14], upon receiving a message, a vehicle can append its own opinion
about its reliability to the message. This message is then forwarded, along
with the appended opinion. In this scheme, a vehicle verifies the reliability
of a message by aggregating all the opinions appended to the message. How-
ever, its robustness against possible collusion of adversaries is not addressed.
Vehicle privacy is also not provided by this scheme. Besides, receiving vehi-
cles have to bear a heavy computational burden in order to verify the digital
signature signed on each opinion - every vehicle has to verify many signa-
tures before appending its own. In addition, implementation details, such as
initialisation and malicious vehicle revocation, are not discussed.
In [23], the reliability of a message is evaluated according to three differ-
ent types of trust value regarding the message generating vehicle: role-based
trust, experience-based trust and majority-based trust. Role-based trust as-
sumes that a vehicle with a certain predefined role, such as traffic patrol
or law enforcing authorities, has a high trust value. Majority-based trust is
similar to the threshold method that we discussed earlier. Experience-based
trust is established based on direct interactions: a vehicle trusts another
vehicle if it has received many reliable messages from the other vehicle in
5
the past. A similar approach to experienced-based trust was also proposed
in [24]. A drawback of this approach is that it requires vehicles to establish a
long-term relationship with each other, which may not be practical in a large
VANET environment. Furthermore, it also requires vehicles to store infor-
mation regarding vehicles that they have encountered in the past. This may
lead to not just a demand for storage but also a demand for rapid search-
ing through the information to make a decision which may result in a lag
in responding to potentially critical events.. Lastly, robustness and vehicle
privacy are not provided.
In [26], a vehicle conducts behaviour analysis about another vehicle based
on some observable information about the target vehicle, such as its positions,
movements and messages broadcast in the past. The result of this analysis is
used to determine the trustworthiness of the target vehicle and the reliability
of messages broadcast by it. However, in this scheme, vehicles have to make
observations before making a decision, which may not be feasible in VANETs.
In addition, robustness and vehicle privacy are not provided by this scheme.
Compared with existing threshold and reputation-based schemes, the
schemes [20, 9] feature the following:
• They enable immediate evaluation: a receiving vehicle does not require
multiple messages in order to verify the reliability of a message.
• They support reliability evaluation of both beacon and event-driven
messages.
• They support revocation of maliciously-behaving vehicles.
• They provide strong robustness against external adversaries, and ro-
bustness against internal adversaries to a reasonably good level.
• They achieve a good level of efficiency.
In addition to the features above, the scheme [9] also provides a good
level of vehicle privacy.
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3 Privacy-aware reputation-based announce-
ment scheme
For completeness, we include a brief description of the privacy-aware reputation-
based announcement scheme [9]. We describe first the algorithms and pro-
tocols that are required:
• A secure and privacy-aware mutual entity authentication protocol MEA+.
We use MEA+{A→ B : m} to denote the situation where the message
m is sent from A to B where both communicating parties A and B are
assured of: 1) the identity of each other, 2) the freshness of the com-
munication, and 3) the protection of the communication against all
entites (apart from A and B) with respect to anonymity and unlinka-
bility. This protocol will be used by vehicles to retrieve their reputation
and report feedback. It can be instantiated by using a secure proba-
bilistic encryption scheme to establish an encrypted channel, and then
executing a suitable authentication protocol in the encrypted channel.
• A secure and privacy-aware two-origin authentication protocol TOA+.
We use TOA+{A : m1,m2 : C} to denote the situation where the mes-
sage (m1,m2) is broadcast by A, and a recipient is given the assurance
that: 1) m1 originates from a legitimate (but unidentified) entity, 2)
m2 originates from a third party C, and 3) m2 is bound to messages
originating from A. This protocol will be used by vehicles to broadcast
messages. It can be implemented using, for example, a group signature
scheme.
• An aggregation algorithm Aggr, which will be used to aggregate feed-
back and produce reputation scores for vehicles.
• A data analysis algorithm Detect, which will be used to detect malicious
vehicles based on feedback.
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• A time discount function TimeDiscount. This is a non-increasing func-
tion whose range is [0, 1]. It takes as input a non-negative value repre-
senting a time difference, and outputs a number between 0 and 1. One
simple example is:
TimeDiscount(t) =
{
1− t/Ψtd if t < Ψtd;
0 if t ≥ Ψtd,
The TimeDiscount function is used to determine the freshness of a ve-
hicle’s reputation score in order to prevent abuse of the system. For
instance, a vehicle may continue to announce messages using its old
reputation credential with higher reputation score in order to avoid
retrieving its latest reputation credentials that may have lower reputa-
tion score after misbehavior. The TimeDiscount function makes sure
that the reputation score is “discounted” with time.
In this case we take the absolute value of the difference between the
current time when a message is received and the time the reputation
certificate was retrieved. An older reputation certificate gives a larger
difference in value which results in a lower value of discounted reputa-
tion score. This is by no means the only possibility for time discount
functions but we have chosen this as the most straightforward option.
• A threshold Ψ between 0 and 1, which will be used to determine
whether a reputation score is sufficiently high.
For completion we will introduce notation for a group signature scheme
that will be used to implement TOA+ in [9]:
A secure group signature scheme [8, 2, 5], denoted by GS = (GKeyGen,
GJoin, GSign, GVerify, Open) where GKeyGen, GJoin, GSign, GVerify and Open
denote group public key generation, group member secret key generation,
group member signing, group verification, and signer revealing algorithms,
respectively. All members of the group has access to the group public key
while each individual member is given its own group member secret key. A
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group signature scheme is a digital signature scheme that has the following
properties:
• Each group member can sign messages (using its group member secret
key).
• A receiver can verify whether the signature was signed by a group mem-
ber (using the group public key with the group verification algorithm),
but cannot discover which group member signed it.
• Any two messages signed by a group member cannot be linked.
• A signature can be “opened” by a group manager (using the signer
revealing algorithm), if necessary, so that the group member who signed
the message is revealed.
(Note that we treat the entire system as one group. Members join when
they register and leave when they are revoked and these are all controlled
centrally. Keys are only updated by time. There is no “group” in the sense of
dynamic networks where members may join and leave different groups at will.
There are indeed some work (for example, [6, 32]) where vehicles travelling
in a certain direction and locality form groups and communicate with each
other within the group. That would happen within our framework.)
3.1 Description of the scheme
This scheme has a centralised architecture with off-line central entities - we
have taken the centralised approach since there is generally a centrally au-
thority governing the registration and administration of vehicles. Vehicles
(V s) are the end users. We assume that V s are mobile entities that have
computational and short range wireless communication devices. The func-
tionalities of vehicles include:
1. generating and broadcasting messages to neighbouring vehicles,
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2. receiving messages from neighbouring vehicles and evaluating their re-
liability, and
3. reporting feedback.
There are two logical off-line central entities: a reputation server (RS ),
and an administrative server (AS ). The RS computes reputation scores for
vehicles based on feedback reported by vehicles. The functionality of the AS
includes:
1. admitting new vehicles into the system and revoking malicious vehicles
from the system,
2. providing reputation endorsement for vehicles, and
3. collecting feedback reported by vehicles.
The AS has multiple remote wireless communication interfaces so that
vehicles can intermittently communicate with the AS in a convenient and
frequent manner (for example once a day). Note that we do not require a
vehicle to be able to constantly communicate with the AS , meaning that the
RS and AS are off-line entities. We assume that the RS and AS are trusted
and interact honestly with each other, and the communication channel be-
tween the RS and AS is secure (authenticated, confidential, and integrity
protected). We assume that the AS has a clock. We also assume that a
vehicle has a clock that is loosely synchronised with the clock of the AS . Al-
though the RS and AS can be separately distributed, one convenient setting
during an implementation is to make them form a single trusted entity, a
central authority. We also assume that the communication channels between
the AS and vehicles, and those between vehicles are publicly open, and thus
subject to attacks.
(I) Scheme Initialisation.
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(a) The AS regulates its clock, and deploys its remote wireless com-
munication interfaces.
(b) The RS creates a database, and installs Aggr and Detect.
(c) The AS installs GS, MEA+, TimeDiscount, and Ψ, and initialises
the cryptographic keys to be used by AS during future execution
of MEA+.
(d) The AS divides the time into time intervals (T0,T1,T2, · · · ). The
length of a time interval is configurable. For example, each time in-
terval can be one day. For each time interval Ti, AS uses GKeyGen
to generate a group public key pki and uses GJoin to generate a
set of corresponding group member secret keys (sk1i , sk
2
i , · · · , skni )
where n is the number of vehicles in the system. A secret key skji
is to be used by vehicle Vj during the time interval Ti. Group
member secret keys (skj0, sk
j
1, sk
j
2, · · · ) are to be used by Vj during
the corresponding time intervals (T0,T1,T2, · · · ). The keys skji
for all i and j are kept confidential for future use.
(II) Vehicle Registration.
(a) The AS initialises the cryptographic keys to be used by V during
future execution of MEA+.
(b) The AS provides V with MEA+, GSign, GVerify, the keys generated
from the previous step, and (pk0, pk1, pk2, · · · ). We assume that
this is conducted over a secure channel.
(c) The AS requests the RS to create a record in its database for
vehicle V .
(III) Reputation Retrieval. When a vehicle Vb drives into the proximity of
a wireless communication interface during a time interval Ti, whose
beginning time is denoted by ti, it retrieves its reputation information
as follows:
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(a) Vb and the AS execute MEA
+ to establish an encrypted and mu-
tually authenticated channel.
(b) Upon retrieving (r, Vb, ti), the reputation score r of Vb at the cur-
rent time ti, from the RS , the AS computes Vb’s time discounted
reputation scores (r′i, r
′
i+1, · · · , r′i+m) until r′i+m+1 < Ψr. A time
discounted reputation score r′i+k = r · TimeDiscount(ti+k − ti),
where ti and ti+k denote the beginning times of Ti and Ti+k, re-
spectively. These scores correspond to the time intervals (Ti, Ti+1,
· · · , Ti+m), respectively. Note that r′i+k ≥ Ψr for 0 ≤ k ≤ m and
r′i+k < Ψr for k > m. In other words, Vb is considered as reputable
for the time intervals Ti, · · · ,Ti+m.
(c) The AS sends Vb in the encrypted and mutually authenticated
channel the group member secret keys (skbi , · · · , skbi+m), which
correspond to Ti, · · · ,Ti+m.
(IV) Message Broadcast. A message m is broadcast by Vb as follows:
(a) Vb retrieves the current time from its clock and identifies its cor-
responding time interval, say Ti.
(b) Vb uses GSign and sk
b
i that corresponds to the time interval Ti,
to generate a signature θ on (m, i), and forms a message tuple
M = (m, i, θ). Vb then broadcasts M to its neighbouring vehicles.
(c) Upon receiving M , a receiving vehicle Vr immediately identifies
the current time interval Tj from its clock. Vr checks if j = i. If
so then Vr uses GVerify and pki, which corresponds to Ti, to verify
θ. Upon successful verification, Vr considers Vb to be reputable,
and the message m to be reliable. The message tuple M is stored
for future possible feedback reporting. If j 6= i or the verification
fails then Vr does not consider Vb to be reputable, and discards
M .
(V) Feedback reporting. When Vr has experience about the event described
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by message m, it is able to judge the reliability of m. Then Vr can
voluntarily report feedback as follows:
(a) Vr assigns a feedback f based on its experience about the reliability
of m;
(b) When Vr drives into the proximity of a wireless communication
interface, Vr and the AS execute MEA
+ to establish an encrypted
and mutually authenticated channel, and Vr sends f,M to the AS
via the channel.
(c) The AS uses Open and pki to open M , in order to retrieve signer
Vb, and sends the RS the tuple (f, Vb, Vr). The RS stores it in the
database.
(d) The RS uses Aggr and all feedback stored in the database to up-
date the reputation of Vb.
(VI) Vehicle Revocation. The AS revokes the identified malicious vehicle by
no longer providing them with new group member secret keys in the
future.
In this scheme, a reputation credential of Vb at time interval Ti is repre-
sented by a group member secret key skbi . Hence TOA
+ is realised by GS:
TOA+{Vb : m, (r′i ≥ Ψ) : AS} = (m, i, θ), where θ = GSignskbi (m, i)). This
gives a recipient assurance that m originated from a reputable (but uniden-
tified) vehicle.
3.2 Privacy and Robustness
This scheme is robust against both external and internal adversaries with
respect to both message fraud (an adversary deceives a vehicle into believing
that a false message is reliable) and reputation manipulation (an adversary
unfairly inflates or deflates the reputation score of a target vehicle) attacks.
It also provides privacy protection (anonymity and unlinkability) for vehicles
against all adversaries except for the central authority [20, 9].
13
3.3 Extending to multiple reputation levels
As described in Section 1, we will extend this scheme to support multiple
reputation levels, thus allowing flexible decision-making for individual vehi-
cles. We will also remove the constraint of having to use a secure channel
for credential retrieval. This extended scheme will be described in Section
5. Before that we will describe in Section 4 a novel modification of a group
signature scheme which will underpin our new scheme.
4 An extension of the BBS scheme
Here we will describe a modification of the BBS [5] group signature scheme
- in essence, both MEA+ and TOA+ will be implemented using this scheme.
This will also allow private reputation score retrieval via a public channel.
While this modified primitive is designed for application within the scenario
of this paper, it has the potential to be of independent interest.
4.1 The BBS Scheme
We first briefly describe, informally, the original BBS [5] group signagure
scheme. Formal details and security proofs can be found in [5]. Let G1, G2
and G3 be three multiplicative cyclic groups of large prime order p. Let g1
be a generator of G1 and g2 a generator of G2. Let ψ be a computatble
isomorphism from G2 to G1, with ψ(g2) = g1. (It is noted in [5] that ψ is
needed only for proofs of security. We need only to assume that it exists and
is efficiently computable.)
Let tˆ : G1 ×G2 → G3 be a computable bilinear map:
tˆ(ua, vb) = tˆ(u, v)ab ∀u ∈ G1, v ∈ G2 and a, b ∈ Z
tˆ(g1, g2) 6= 1
We require that the q-Strong Diffie-Hellman (q-SDH) problem is hard in
(G1,G2) and the Decision Linear Diffie-Hellman problem is hard in G1:
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The q-SDH problem in (G1,G2) is as follows: given a (q + 2)-tuple
(g1, g2, g
γ
2 , g
γ2
2 , . . . , g
γq
2 ) as input, output a pair (g
1
γ+x
1 , x), where x ∈ Z∗p.
The Decision Linear Diffie-Hellman problem is as follows: given u, v, h,
ua, vb, hc ∈ G1 as input, decide whether a+ b = c.
The BBS group signature scheme BBS = (BKeyGen, BJoin, BSign, BVerify,
BOpen) where BKeyGen, BJoin, BSign, BVerify and BOpen denote group pub-
lic key generation, group member secret key generation, group member sign-
ing, group verification, and signer revealing algorithms, respectively, is as
follows. (We will write x←S to denote the action of sampling an element
from S uniformly at random and assigning the result to the variable x.)
• BKeyGen:
In key generation BKeyGen generates G1, G2, G3, g1, g2, ψ and tˆ as
described above. Let η1, η2←Z∗p, h←G1 \ {1G1}, and set u, v ∈ G1 such
that uη1 = vη2 = h. Let γ←Z∗p, and set w = gγ2 ∈ G2.
The group public key gpk will be (g1, g2, u, v, h, w).
The secret key of the group manager is gmsk = (γ, η1, η2). Note that
(η1, η2) is used to open signatures.
Let H be a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp.
• BJoin(b, gmsk):
Each group member b is given a secret key gskb = (Ab, xb), where
xb←Z∗p, and Ab = g
1
γ+xb
1 ∈ G1.
• BSign(M, gskb, gpk):
For group member b to sign the messageM using gpk = (g1, g2, u, v, h, w)
and gskb = (Ab, xb), let α, β←Zp, and compute T1 = uα, T2 = vβ,
T3 = Abh
α+β.
Now let rα, rβ, rx, rδ1 , rδ2←Zp, and compute R1 = urα , R2 = vrβ ,
R4 = T
rx
1 u
−rδ1 , R5 = T rx2 v
−rδ2 and
R3 = tˆ(T3, g2)
rx tˆ(h,w)−rα−rβ tˆ(h, g2)−rδ1−rδ2 .
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Compute c = H(M,T1, T2, T3, R1, R2, R3, R4, R5), and let δ1 = xbα,
δ2 = xbβ. Compute sα = rα + cα, sβ = rβ + cβ, sx = rx + cxb,
sδ1 = rδ1 + cδ1 and sδ2 = rδ2 + cδ2.
The signature on M is σ = (T1, T2, T3, c, sα, sβ, sx, sδ1 , sδ2).
• BVerify(M,σ, gpk):
To verify a signature σ = (T1, T2, T3, c, sα, sβ, sx, sδ1 , sδ2) on the message
M using the group public key gpk = (g1, g2, u, v, h, w), compute R˜1 =
usαT−c1 , R˜2 = v
sβT−c2 , R˜4 = T
sx
1 u
−sδ1 , R˜5 = T sx2 u
−sδ2 , and
R˜3 =tˆ(T3, g2)
sx tˆ(h,w)−sα−sβ
tˆ(h, g2)
−sδ1−sδ2
(
tˆ(T3, w)
tˆ(g1, g2)
)c
.
The signature σ is valid if c = H(M,T1, T2, T3, R˜1, R˜2, R˜3, R˜4, R˜5).
Otherwise it is invalid.
• BOpen(M,σ, gmsk, gpk):
To open the signature, run BVerify(M,σ, gpk). If σ is a valid signature
on M , then the first part of the signer’s secret key can be retrieved:
A = T3
T
η1
1 T
η2
2
.
4.2 An extension of the BBS Scheme
Suppose that every group member b has some value in Zp assigned to it by
the group manager. This value changes with time, so that at some time
interval Ti, this value is rbi. We want to modify the BBS scheme in such
a way that this value rbi is bound to the group member’s signature and
is visible from it. When rbi changes, the group member is able to obtain
an update without a secure channel. The group public key gpk will also
have to be modified accordingly using some public information. We will call
this modified scheme the BBS∗ scheme, and it consists of the algorithms
(BKeyGen∗, BJoin∗, BUpdate∗, BSign∗, BVerify∗, BOpen∗).
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• BKeyGen∗:
In addition to the parameters generated in BKeyGen, we have the fol-
lowing public parameters:
– Time intervals T0, T1, T2, . . ..
– For each time internal Ti, we have a random base value ki ∈
G1 \ {1G1}. A possible way to compute ki from Ti is using a
public hash function, say H ′, so that ki = H ′(Ti) ∈ G1 \ {1G1}.
– A set of values R = {0, 1, 2, ...,m} ⊂ Zp, where m < p. In each
time interval Ti a group member b has a specific value, denoted
by rbi ∈ R assigned to it.
For each value of r ∈ R, and each time interval Ti we have a group
public key denoted by gpkir,
gpkir = (gˆ1ir = g1 · kri , g2, u, v, h, w).
Hence we have m+1 group public keys gpkir in each time interval. The
secret key of the group manager is as before, gmsk = (γ, η1, η2).
• BJoin∗(b, gmsk):
This is the same as BJoin(b, gmsk). Each group member b is given a
secret key gskb = (Ab, xb), where xb←Z∗p, and Ab = g
1
γ+xb
1 ∈ G1.
• BUpdate∗(b, i, rbi, gskb, gmsk):
At time interval Ti, the group member b which has value rbi may obtain
an update of its secret signing key gskb = (Ab, xb) as follows.
The group manager computes ki = H
′(Ti), Ri = krbii , rcerti = R
1
γ+xb
i ,
and updates Ab to Abi where Abi = Ab · rcerti.
The group member b is given rcerti publicly. When b receives rcerti it
first checks whether tˆ(rcerti, wg
xb
2 ) = tˆ(Ri, g2). If so, it then updates
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its secret signing key gskb = (Ab, xb) to gskbi = (Abi, xb); otherwise the
received rcerti is discarded (as it is corrupted or tampered with during
the transmission).
• BSign∗(M, i, rbi, gskbi, gpkirbi):
To sign the message M at time interval Ti, a group member b with
assigned value rbi performs BSign(M, gskbi, gpkirbi). The signature on
M is σ∗ = (T1, T2, T3, c, sα, sβ, sx, sδ1 , sδ2 , i, rbi).
• BVerify∗(M,σ∗, gpk):
To verify the signature σ∗ on M , signed by a group member with as-
signed value r in the time interval Ti, i.e. σ∗ = (T1, T2, T3, c, sα, sβ, sx, sδ1 , sδ2 , i, r),
the verifier updates gpk to gpkir = (gˆ1ir, g2, u, v, h, w) by computing
gˆ1ir = g1 · kri . It then uses BVerify(M,σ, gpkir) to verify if σ is valid,
where σ = (T1, T2, T3, c, sα, sβ, sx, sδ1 , sδ2).
• BOpen∗(M,σ∗, gmsk, gpk):
To open the signature σ on M , signed by a group member with assigned
value r in the time interval Ti, run BVerify∗(M,σ∗, gpk) first. If the
signature is valid then the first part of the signer’s secret key in time
interval Ti can be retrieved: Abi = T3T η11 T η22 .
4.3 Security of the BBS∗ scheme
We argue that the BBS∗ scheme is both correct and secure.
It is straightforward to verify that the BBS∗ scheme is correct. In fact,
each instance of the BBS∗ scheme is indeed a BBS scheme.
The modification of BBS to BBS∗ consists of multiplying g1 in the public
key gpk with a public value kri , sending rcerti publicly and using it to modify
part of the user b’s secret key Ab. We argue that neither of these changes
affect the security of BBS:
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• Multiplying g1 with a public value: This does not affect the group
manager’s secret key and does not allow forgery of group members’
secret keys.
• Sending rcerti publicly: This does not reveal the secret values of γ,
Ab or xb if BBS is secure. If an adversary could obtain γ or xb from
rcerti then setting Ri = g1, the adversary could also obtain γ or xb from
Ab, thus allowing it to forge further group members’ secret keys.
5 Using BBS∗ to enable a privacy-aware scheme
We now show how to deploy BBS∗ to enable a privacy-aware announcement
scheme. This scheme has a centralised architecture with two off-line central
authorities AS , RS , and vehicles (V s) as end users. The roles of these entities
are as described in Section 3.1. The management of the reputation system
is the same as the scheme of [9].
Let R = {0, 1, . . . ,m}, m < p, represent the m+ 1 reputation levels. At
time interval Ti, a vehicle Vb has a specific reputation level, denoted by rbi.
The method on how to establish such a level for a vehicle is the same as the
method used in the scheme of [9]. The group signature scheme BBS∗ allows
the binding of the reputation level visibly to a group signature.
Now we describe this new scheme in detail. We will follow the same
presentation structure as used in Section 3.
5.1 Scheme Initialisation
This is executed once only, when the announcement scheme is set up.
1. The AS regulates its clock, and deploys its remote wireless communi-
cation interfaces.
2. The RS creates a database, and installs Aggr and Detect.
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3. The AS installs BBS∗, TimeDiscount, and Ψ and divides the time into
time intervals (T0,T1,T2, · · · ).
4. The AS executes BKeyGen∗ to obtain (G1,G2,G3, g1, g2, ψ, tˆ, H) and
AS ’s public key is gpk and secret key is gmsk.
5.2 Vehicle Registration
This is executed when a new vehicle Vb requests to join the announcement
scheme. It takes place in a secure environment: all communication is confi-
dential and authenticated.
1. The AS provides V with BUpdate∗, BSign∗, BVerify∗, and gpk.
2. The AS and Vb executes BJoin
∗(b, gmsk), and Vb recieves its group
member secret key gskb = (Ab, xb).
3. The AS requests the RS to create a record in its database for vehicle
Vb, indexed by Ab.
5.3 Reputation Retrieval
When a vehicle Vb drives into the proximity of a wireless communication
interface at time Ti, it retrieves its reputation information as follows:
1. Vb signs a reputation score request using gskbi. This authenticates Vb
to AS . This signature is then opened using BOpen∗ and AS is thus
able to request the correct reputation score from RS .
2. Upon retrieving (rbi, Vb, ti), the reputation score of Vb at the current
time ti, from the RS , the AS computes Vb’s time discounted reputation
scores (r′i, r
′
i+1, · · · , r′i+d) until r′i+d+1 < Ψ.
3. The AS then calculates Rj = k
r′j
j for public kj and rcertj = R
1
γ+xb
j for
j = i, . . . i+ d.
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4. The AS sends rcerti, rcerti+1, . . . , rcerti+d to Vb publicly and keeps a
record of them.
5. Vb checks whether tˆ(rcertj, wg
xb
2 ) = tˆ(Rj, g2) for j = i, . . . i + d. If
so then it updates its signing key gsk = (Ab, xb) to gskbj = (Abj, xb)
where Abj = Ab · rcertj, j = i, . . . i + d. In essence Vb and AS run
BUpdate∗(b, j, rbj, gskbj, gmsk) for j = i, . . . i+ d.
5.4 Message Broadcast
A message M is broadcast by Vb at time interval Ti as follows:
1. Vb retrieves the current time from its clock and identifies its correspond-
ing time interval, say Ti.
2. Vb uses BSign
∗(M, i, rbi, gskbi, gpkirbi) to generate a signature σ
∗ on M ,
and forms a message tuple msg = (M,σ∗). Vb then broadcasts msg to
its neighbouring vehicles.
3. Upon receiving msg = (M,σ∗), a receiving vehicle Vr immediately iden-
tifies the current time interval Tj from its clock. Vr checks if j = i. If
so then Vr uses BVerify
∗(M,σ∗, gpk) to verify σ∗. Upon successful ver-
ification, Vr can now decide whether to trust the announcement based
on its own policy. The message tuple msg is stored for future possible
feedback reporting. If j 6= i or the verification fails then Vr does not
consider Vb to be reputable, and thus discards M .
5.5 Feedback reporting
When Vr has experience of the event described by message M , it is able to
judge the reliability of M . Then Vr can voluntarily report feedback.
1. Vr assigns a feedback f based on its experience about the reliability of
M and forms a feedback report fr = (f,msg).
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2. When Vr drives into the proximity of a wireless communication interface
during time interval Tj, Vr sends fr and BSign∗(fr, j, rrj, gskrj, gpkjrrj)
to AS .
3. The AS verifies Vr’s signature. If it is valid it runs BOpen
∗(msg, gmsk, gpk)
to obtain Abi. It then sends the corresponding feedback f to RS .
5.6 Vehicle Revocation
The AS revokes the identified malicious vehicle by no longer providing them
with new rcerti in the future. The revoked vehicle will not be able to construct
valid signatures without rcerti.
5.7 Privacy and Robustness
The privacy of this scheme, as in the scheme of [9], depends on the security of
MEA+ and TOA+. If BBS∗ is secure then all data sent by a vehicle is protected
with respect to anonymity and unlinkability against all entites except for the
AS .
Observe that our privacy-aware scheme still features the same robustness
as the schemes of [9, 20] against adversaries. An adversary is not able to im-
personate an existing vehicle or forge a legitimate broadcast message. This
is because group member signing keys are updated securely in BBS∗ by legit-
imate vehicles, and external adversaries are unable to obtain a valid group
member secret key. In addition, all approaches that can be used in [9, 20] to
prevent internal adversaries conducting reputation manipulation can also be
used in this new scheme.
5.8 A note on Computational and Communication Over-
heads
Group signatures are generally regarded as resource intensive and time-
consuming. We briefly comment on the additional computational and com-
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munication burden in using BBS∗ for VANET announcements compared to
[9].
Firstly, there are VANET announcement schemes using the group sig-
nature scheme BBS and they are shown to be feasible theoretically and by
simulation, for example, in [21, 9]. The new BBS∗ scheme is based on BBS,
with a few more operations:
• BUpdate∗ performs one check and one calculation. The check involves 2
pairings, 1 point multiplication and 1 exponentiation. The calculation
requires 1 point multiplication.
• BVerify∗ requires 1 additional point multiplication and 1 exponentia-
tion.
Altogether the BBS∗ scheme requires 2 extra pairings, 3 extra point mul-
tiplications and 2 extra exponentiation compared to [9]. However, this is
instead of having to establish a secure and private channel for reputation
retrieval, which requires encryption as well as a digital signature. For a ve-
hicle to sign a request and to verify a signature from the server will take 1
pairing, 2 point multiplications and 3 exponentiations (1 exponentiation for
signing, 2 exponentiation, 2 multiplication, 1 pairing for verification) for the
Boneh-Boyen scheme [4]. Hence the computational overhead to being able to
retrieve private values in public is about 1 pairing and 1 point multiplication.
To be conservative, even for 128-bit security (most proposals are using
80-bit security which is sufficient since most VANET announcements are
ephemeral) and using only 400 MHz processor [29], 1 pairing will take 5 ms
[1] and 1 multiplication will take 0.5 ms (using 200 000 cycle per second for
multiplication, which is also conservative according to [16].) Hence we add
at most 5.5 ms.
As for signature length, we have two more elements, i and rbi. We take
4 bytes for i (a time-related parameter, 4 bytes are sufficient for timestamps
[21]) and 170 bits for rbi (which is an element of Zp, and p is 170 bits for
80-bit security). This adds to the original BBS signature of length 1533
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bits [5], so we have a signature for BBS∗ with length 1735 bits (about 217
bytes), and this is under 250 bytes which is the requirement for vehicular
communications [18].
The additional download for BUpdate∗ is public and rcerti is also 170 bits
only, so this does not present a barrier.
6 Conclusion
We have shown a reputation-based announcement scheme in VANETs which
supports flexible decision-making using explicit multiple reputation levels
- a vehicle may decide on its own policy whether to trust announcements
of different types depending on the announcing vehicle’s reputation score.
It also allows private reputation score retrieval via a public channel, thus
preserving user privacy across the wireless interface. This is enabled by our
construction of a new primitive based on a group signature scheme. Two
questions are of interest:
1. Can this privacy-aware reputation scheme be used for other types of
network? The robustness of this scheme against reputation manipu-
lation depends on the relatively slow propagation of data. VANETs
meet this requirement since data transmissions is largely achieved by
short-range wireless medium. How robustness can be acheived while
guaranteeing privacy in a network with fast propagation, such as the
internet, seems to be a hard problem.
2. Are there other applications for the primitive BBS∗? This offers a
feature that allows a user to demonstrate some property within a group
signature. In this particular application, the property is presented by
two values, a time and a reputation score. In general, the property
could be anything, such as a degree, a location or a position, and
multiple properties can be bound together in one signature. Similar
ideas have been considered in other areas, such as anonymous credential
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and attribute-based signatures, and we believe BBS∗ may turn out to
be of independent interest.
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